War Log Explorer
MND-NORTH OPS LNO
Type of unit
MND-NORTH OPS LNO
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CIOC - Trends and Networks
USF-I CCIR 3: SIGNIFICANT STATUS OR CAPABILITY CHANGE OF KEY INFRASTRUCTURE OR ESSENTIAL SERVICES.
MND-NORTH OPS LNO
(EXPLOSIVE HAZARD) IED EXPLOSION RPT (Improvised Explosive Device (IED)) CDR/A/- : %%% INJ/DAM
Take care; definitions may be wrong.
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/ : %%%-FFIR %%% WHO: CDR/A/-%%% WHAT: IED - Confirmed - Effective WHEN: 312145DEC09 WHERE: %%%, Ninewah Province, IVO %%% NARRATIVE: At 2145hrs (31DEC09), CDR/A/-%%% was informed by a LN that there had been an IED detonation on railroad tracks near %%% IVO ( %%%) targeting a train. CDR/A/-%%% contacted the %%% An %%% and was informed that IP were already on site. The IP also reported that the conductor had been kidnapped. //-%%%, who was patrolling on RTE %%%, was diverted to the location. SWT conducted aerial %%% and confirmed the location IVO %%%. UPDATE: At 2343hrs (31DEC09) //-%%% arrived on site IVO %%%. UPDATE: At 0021hrs (01JAN10) EOD and /-%%% was notified of IED. At 0050hrs (01JAN10) EOD and /-%%% SP %%%-WEST enroute to IED/DET IVO %%% IOT conduct PBA. At 0153hrs (01JAN10) EOD linked up with //- %%% of IED-DET IVO %%%. UPDATE: At 0230hrs (01JAN09) //-%%% reported IP'%%% confirmed that there was no kidnaping. As IPs were moving to the location, the trains engineers thought they were the responsible party that %%% the IED and immediately %%% from that location. IPs are working to get the two men ( %%%) back to the site. UPDATE: At 0300hrs (01JAN09) //-%%% reports Two individuals, the Engineers of the Train, were located at their bosses house ( %%%) and IP'%%% are working to try and find the location of the house. Also //-%%% reports that the %%% individuals ( ) %%% to Mosul %%% by IP'%%%. UPDATE: At 0317hrs (01JAN10) //-%%% reported that EOD enroute back to %%%-WEST and initial %%% on site indicated , no command wire found. Also IP'%%% were unable to find location of the bosses ( %%%) house, but have %%% with the boss ( %%%) of the %%% individuals ( %%%) . IP'%%% also confirm that the %%% individuals ( ) %%% Mosul %%% to fill out a detailed report of the incident. At 0340hrs (01JAN10) //-%%% enroute back to JSS ASH %%%. EOD %%% : Team -%%% responded to a PBA at grid %%% ISO A Co /%%%. A LN train was heading south when it was struck by an IED causing it to derail. The train consisted of just one engine (no cars were present). Team -%%% established a safe area at grid %%%. Team -%%% identified the blast crater approximately ten meters behind where the train came to rest. Team -%%% recovered fragmentation from the IED in the blast crater. IED consisted of approximately 30lbs of UBE. No initiation system was found. All items were turned over to WIT %%% for further exploitation. No casualties were reported. S2 %%%: This is the first report of an attack against the railroad. It is assessed that ISI initiated this attack. It is %%% if there were threats leveled at the railroad company prior to the attack. Recent reporting within Rogue AO has stated that %%% are threatening violence if they '%%% receive money. Rogue AO has seen reports throughout the AO of %%% demanding money. This in part finances their operations against USF and scares the populace. It is unknown if this same type of threat was leveled at the train company prior to the attack. It is assessed that %%% are in short supply of IED equipment as well as arms. This could be in part the reason why there are so many small IEDs. You could possibly start to see a shift in public support as %%% continue to threaten local nationals. %%% has %%% stated that they %%% LN but fight operations against USF. ISI maintains an aggressive front against USF/ISF/LN. It is assessed that due to the amount of reports involving the use of terror tactics to obtain money there is a financial crisis among %%% in Rogue AO. BDA: Engineer car de-%%%, with %%% damage. Train still in upright position. /////CLOSED/////%%%